Why have some seemingly promising futures contracts not succeeded in the recent past? In this paper, we will examine one such example, the pulp market. The structure of this paper is as follows. First we summarize the individual attempts at launching pulp futures contracts, and then we note how the pulp markets match up (or not) against the various criteria for the successful launch of a futures contract.
. FOEX
Date
Exchange Key Problems 1996-1998 FOEX FOEX...chose, with a clear recommendation from the pulp and paper industry, the cash-settled approach. The product was NBSKP market pulp in Europe. FOEX used the PIX-index, developed for the purpose and accepted by the different parties of trading. FOEX traded, however, only about 100,000 tons before closing the Exchange and converting into an index provider. The key reason for very limited trading was the insistence of one of the regulators of trading between only Exchange and industry participants, without the normal intermediaries, i.e. the banks and brokers. After ceasing trading in summer 1998 and closing the Exchange officially in May 1999, FOEX converted its activity into a specialized index (or price benchmark) provider. The company name was altered to FOEX Indexes Ltd.
 Disagreement between the two regulating bodies (Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Finland "Inspection and Control Office") over how the laws should be interpreted; requirement by Bank of Finland that only direct company contracts allowed (no banks, no brokers)  Exchange was viewed to be "too small"  Obligatory collateral requirement which, in times of already poor profitability (1997) (1998) (1999) , was a problem for some participants  Competition from Pulpex project from mid 1997 (see below), especially as Pulpex viewed FOEX as a competitor  Lack of market makers (as brokers excluded)
Source: WRAP (2007).
Key to Terms FOEX was originally the Finnish Options Exchange, according to http://www.foex.fi/index.php?page=alias, which in turn was accessed on November 21, 2014. In addition, Lehtinen (2014) described his experiences as a PULPEX market-maker and provided the following possible reasons for why the contract failed:  Many different pulp grades;  Counterparties did not accept benchmark grades, which could then have been used for adding premiums or subtracting discounts to the benchmark in individual deals;
 The forestry industry did not support transparent pricing;  The banks for forestry companies did not require hedging price risk as a condition for lending to the companies;  A lack of market makers: at best there were three active market-makers; and  Pulp as a product has thus far not been well understood by financial participants and speculators. 
CME Group
The CME Group launched a softwood pulp index futures contract in September 2007. The exchange later launched a hardwood pulp index futures contract as well. Both contracts were cash-settled to indexes provided by "FOEX Indexes Ltd. FOEX is a private Finland-based independent company that specializes in providing audited, trademarked registered pulp and paper price indexes ... [and is] the industry standard for the global forest products industry." The contract specifications for both contracts are on the next page. Like past efforts, the trading volume for the contract was always low. Both contracts were permanently delisted in 2012.
Source: CME Group (2008a). Source: CME Group (2008b), p. 3.
According to Kokontis (2014) , the "lack of initial liquidity" can kill a contract's prospects. Table 7 shows the total yearly trading volume (in contracts) for the CME Group's softwood pulp futures contract. Source: The Bloomberg. Table 8 shows the total yearly trading volume (in contracts) for the CME Group's hardwood pulp futures contract. In 2010 the yearly volume was 325 contracts. reaches that level during the third year after it has been innovated." Silber's "justification for the 10,000 volume criterion is that a contract trading at that level is unlikely to be delisted by an exchange (unless regulations are imposed)." By Silber's metric, both CME Group contracts were, unfortunately, far from success stories.
How the Pulp Markets Match Up Against the Various Criteria for the Successful Launch of a Futures Contract
We can also approach the analysis of why pulp futures trading has not been successful in a more conceptual fashion. Specifically, we can review the criteria provided by one economist and two academics to determine whether the pulp markets are just not suitable for futures trading. Namely, we will successively examine how the pulp markets fare against criteria established by Dr. Richard Sandor, Professor Charles Cuny, and Professor Craig Pirrong. Table 9 summarizes the criteria provided by the economist, Richard Sandor, on whether a new futures contract might succeed or not. Sandor's Criteria  Price variability of the commodity is sufficient;  The price of the commodity is competitively determined;  Either the commodity is homogeneous, or there is close movement of prices of different grades of the commodity;  A prior pattern of forward contracting has broken down;  There must be a viable cash market (i.e., a market for immediate delivery) in order to facilitate the delivery procedure; and  The futures contract must be properly specified so that hedgers will be attracted to the futures market.
Dr. Richard Sandor's Criteria

Source: Sandor (1973).
A Sandor Criterion Met: Sufficient Volatility
At least under of one Sandor's criteria, it would seem that the pulp market would be a good candidate for a successful futures contract. Pulp prices have been sufficiently volatile for this market to have merit as a potential futures contract, as shown in Figure 2 . 
A Sandor Criterion Not Met: A Prior Pattern of Forward Contracting Has Broken Down
Sandor (1973) was prophetic in understanding a key driver for the later success of crude oil futures contracts; that is, a prior pattern of forward contracting broke down for this commodity market, leading to the need for futures markets for managing price risk. We will briefly describe that history here, followed by discussing the relevance of this point to pulp markets. In review, the structure of the oil industry changed in the 1970s after numerous nationalizations in oil-producing countries. This forced some oil companies to shift from long-term contracts to the spot oil market, as described in Yergin (1992 Forward contracting does appear to continue to satisfy sophisticated commercial participants, as seen in a recent Canfor Corporation financial report, which is summarized in Table 10 . In other words, a need for futures hedging has not emerged, given the viability of direct forward contracting amongst commercial participants. 
Professor Charles Cuny's Key Criterion
In Cuny's (1993), the author's key point is that it is not hedging demand per se that matters for a contract's success, but net hedging demand. Net hedging demand, in turn, refers to hedging demand that is not directly met by other hedgers, resulting in the economic need for intermediaries (speculators) to assume the price risk of the commodity. This point is closely related to Sandor's observation that futures contracts seem to be able to gain traction if a previous pattern of direct forward contracting amongst commercials breaks down.
The contribution of Cuny is that he arrives at this point by reasoning from first principles how it is that a futures exchange can exist in the first place. The following summarizes Cuny's reasoning:
a. "Exchanges are taken to be entrepreneurial entities that design markets …" b. The goal of exchanges is to "maximize their own revenues." c. They do so by designing futures contracts that "maximize transaction volume." d. Commercial "hedgers are not normally in the business of providing liquidity" to a futures market; that is not their core business. Therefore, commercial hedgers are not the participants who provide the necessary amount of transaction volume for an exchange to be able to exist.
e. An exchange's trading volume is largely provided by those who stand ready to take on and manage the risk from commercial hedgers: the speculators.
f. But the services of speculators are not needed if hedging demand is largely balanced out amongst commercial participants. g. Therefore, substantial net hedging demand is needed for a contract to be viable on a futures exchange.
h. Note that this nuanced view does not contradict Holbrook Working's approach, which emphasizes that a "futures market owes its existence to the demand generated by hedgers." Cuny helpfully refines the Working approach by noting further that it is net hedging demand that is what is most important.
i. Therefore, when "selecting a contract, an exchange [will naturally] align itself with the greatest unsatisfied hedging demand …" Using Cuny's logic, if direct forward contracting satisfies the hedging needs of pulp market participants, then there is no need for price-riskbearing specialists, as exist in futures markets, to be compensated for sharing in this risk.
Correspondingly, there would be no economic need for a futures contract on pulp.
Professor Craig Pirrong's Criteria
a. Pirrong Criteria That Are Satisfied: Standardization, Large Inventories, and Sufficient Volatility
In Pirrong (2014), the author notes that both standardization and large inventories that need to be hedged are essential for a commodity to have a successful futures contract.
"Pulp is as or more standardized than a good deal of other commodities that support viable contracts." And in fact, "the pulp market [is] … big enough (compared to … [for example] cotton … and the softs [which, in turn, do support futures trading]," writes Pirrong.
WRAP (2007) reinforces Pirrong's point regarding the pulp market sharing characteristics with commodities that do have successful futures contracts. Aluminum is "hedge-traded with huge success. Physical production of aluminum is about 2/3 of the tonnage in the global pulp market (currently about 40 million tonnes) but hedge trading volumes in aluminum now exceed the annual physical volumes actually marketed by a factor of 10." Further, "[i]n tonnage terms, market pulp, recovered fibre and paper [would seem to] have the potential to become the third largest commodity product group hedged globally, after oil and wheat," according to the WRAP report.
Pirrong also notes that commodity markets need sufficient price volatility in order to warrant interest in hedging. According to the author, price volatility for pulp has been "comparable to some other commodities," which have thriving futures contracts.
WRAP (2007), once again, confirms a Pirrong criterion. "The costs attached to price risk management are not high [,] but they still need to be covered by the price gains or cost savings obtainable from hedging. Market intelligence indicates that if price volatility is less than 5%, hedging does not offer sufficient incentive. When volatility is between 5-15%, one should consider it. If volatility exceeds 15%, it is strongly recommended. Average price volatility for market pulp is in the vicinity of 20-25%," according to the WRAP study.
So far the pulp market has met all of Pirrong's criteria for the successful launch of a futures contract. But one prerequisite has been crucially missing, and it relates to both Sandor's observation and Cuny's theory.
b. A Pirrong Criterion That Is Not Satisfied: Fragmented Marketing Chains
According to Pirrong (2014) , "futures contracts are most viable when …" not only are there "large holdings of inventories to be hedged", but also when "there are relatively fragmented marketing chains …" Noted the researcher: there has been "a lot of vertical integration in pulp, and even freely traded pulp … [has] not been traded in long chains like grain or oil is. [As a result, there are] few trader intermediaries … [with] most [pulp] traded directly from pulp producers to paper producers."
Pirrong summarized this consideration as an "industrial organization issue."
Framing the issue as one of "industrial organization" is another way of thinking about what markets could be suitable for the launch of a successful futures market. In contrast to the pulp market, the industrial organization of the natural gas market became conducive to the launch of a successful futures market by the early 1990s, as will now be discussed.
According to IEA (2012), "Liberalization changed the structure of the US gas industry. Before, strong regulation applied to the different stages, from production to transmission to distribution, to longterm contracts between producers, interstate pipeline companies and distribution companies. Liberalization and open access to pipelines starting in 1985 led to the creation of the competitive wholesale gas market and a new type of company appeared -gas marketers, which are the link between producers on one side, and distribution companies as well as large consumers on the other side." [Italics added.] Exhibit 3 provides a graphic Augustine et al. (2006) that "shows schematically some of the types of natural gas transactions that take place as gas makes its way from the fields where it is produced to end users' burner tips." According to Augustine et al. (2006) , some natural gas producers "sell their gas to marketers who have the ability to aggregate natural gas into quantities that fit the needs of different types of buyers and to transport gas to their buyers. Marketers may be large or small and sell to local distribution companies or to commercial or industrial customers connected directly to pipelines or served by local distribution companies." "Marketers are able to meet customers' differing needs by bringing together a large number of buyers and sellers. In addition, marketers and other buyers and sellers of natural gas are able to use financial instruments traded on exchanges to hedge the risks associated with price volatility," write Augustine et al. (2006) . (Italics added.)
In contrast to the pulp industry where there are fewer trader intermediaries, from this brief description of the structure of the natural gas industry, one can see how the natural gas market meets Pirrong's criterion on the type of industrial organization that is promising for futures contract development.
Conclusion
In reviewing the criteria for a successful futures contract, one could argue that pulp futures contracts have not been successful because:
 A prior pattern of forward contracting has not broken down;  There has been insufficient net hedging demand; and  The industrial organization of the pulp industry is not conducive to the success of a futures market. The common theme with each of these points is that it appears that the pulp industry has not been in need of price-risk-bearing intermediaries, whom, in turn, can provide this service on futures exchanges.
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